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the transition paths of each case, and ﬁnd that the introduction of a consumption
tax and a capital income tax improves the welfare of young and future households,
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11 Introduction
Many developed countries in Europe, as well as Japan, have become aging societies.
Faced with aging, governments in such countries have taken social security reforms into
account seriously to sustain the system. When considering social security reforms, we
should examine the source of ﬁnance for the reforms, because some reforms may result in
intergenerational and intragenerational redistribution. Many countries have adopted a
ﬂat payroll tax rate for social security; however, such a ﬂat tax may adversely aﬀect labor
incentives and wealth accumulation. In this case, alternatives such as a consumption
tax or a capital income tax may provide a possible means of improving social welfare.
In general, social security systems have large redistributive eﬀects on lifetime income.
Table 1 shows the redistribution eﬀects of the social security system. For example,
Italy and Greece provide social security payments at the same replacement rate for
all types of households, and Germany provides almost the same replacement rate by
earnings. In contrast, in Canada, Japan, and the UK, low earning households receive
a relatively high public pension, which implies a high gross replacement rate, and the
social security payment for the rich amounts to less than 30% of their earnings. Moreover,
the replacement rate level diﬀers among countries. There exist three groups: the high
replacement rate group including Greece, Italy, and Sweden, the middle group including
Canada and France, and the low-level group including Germany, Japan, and the UK.
The social security system in some countries actually redistributes resources not only
intergenerationally but also intragenerationally; however, the progressivity of the social
security system diﬀers among OECD countries. The pension Gini coeﬃcient and the
progressivity of the public pension, which is calculated as one minus pension Gini over
the Gini coeﬃcient of workers’ earnings, diﬀers signiﬁcantly among countries. If the
progressivity index is close to zero, the public pension does not have a redistribution
eﬀect, because it maintains the earnings inequality of workers even after retirement.
According to OECD (2007), there are large diﬀerences among OECD countries in the
redistribution eﬀect of the social security system.
Following OECD (2007), we separate the role of the social security system into
two parts: (a) insurance (annuity) part and (b) redistribution part. Concerning the
2insurance part, it is widely believed that the social security system should be actuarially
fair. On the other hand, in the redistribution part, a minimum ﬂoor is required for
the consumption or redistribution of resources through the social security system. For
this reason, in many countries, the social security system comprises a two-tier structure.
The ﬁrst tier comprises three types of redistribution schemes, basic pension schemes,
resource-tested plans, and the minimum pension. In the developed countries, how the
ﬁrst tier is constructed diﬀers signiﬁcantly. For example, in the US, the government
imposes a resource test for receipt of a public pension (Table 1).1 On the other hand,
in Japan, all residents receive the same amount of basic pension. Some countries adopt
a mixture of the three roles, e.g., the UK. The second tier comprises two typical forms
of social security systems, deﬁned beneﬁt and deﬁned contribution. Although a limit is
set on the second tier, it is basically earnings-related. The overall average entitlement of
the ﬁrst tier in the OECD amounts to 25%, which is not small. Therefore, in this study,
we focus on the redistributive eﬀect of the social security system, especially on the ﬁrst
tier.
Many theoretical studies have been conducted on social security reforms using an
overlapping generations model. Moreover, because research on social security reform
requires numerical values such as tax rates, quantitative studies on the social security
system have attracted attention, since the pioneering research by Auerbach and Kotlikoﬀ
(1987). In particular, current research focuses on social security reform in an economy
with heterogeneous agents, due to its redistribution eﬀect. For example, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu,
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Joines (1995) investigate the optimal replacement rate based on a
stationary state comparison in such an environment. Huang, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent
(1997), De Nardi, ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu, and Sargent (1999), and Conesa and Krueger (1999)
consider the transitional dynamics of aging and social security reform. Nishiyama and
Smetters (2007) extend a traditional research topic, the privatization of the public pen-
sion system, into a stochastic overlapping generations model with heterogeneous agents.
Recently, Krueger and Ludwig (2006) and Attanasio, Kitao, and Violante (2007) extend
the model into an open macroeconomy with aging to include the eﬀects of international
1In a partial equilibrium model, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1995) investigate the redistributive
eﬀects of the social security system, especially the eﬀect of the means test.
3capital ﬂows. Although Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (1999) and Huggett and Ven-
tura (1999) consider the redistributive eﬀect of social security based on the US system,
they focus on the stationary state. In this paper, we focus on the role of the ﬁrst tier,
the redistribution part, of the social security system in the stationary state and its tran-
sitional dynamics. Moreover, we consider the sources of ﬁnance for the reforms, such as
a consumption tax and a capital income tax.
To consider social security reforms, we employ an overlapping generations model
with heterogeneous agents. The features of our model are as follows. Our model is
based on Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005, 2007), who
extend the stationary equilibrium model constructed by Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
(1996). There are inﬁnitely many households who face idiosyncratic income risks. The
government manages the social security system as a pay-as-you-go system. We assume
that the social security payment is the basic type, i.e., constant payment for the retired,
and we also assume that there are private annuity markets. Extending the research
by Conesa and Krueger (1999), we examine the sources of ﬁnance for social security
reform in an aging economy. We calibrate the parameters for the Japanese economy and
calculate the stationary equilibrium and the transitional dynamics of the aging economy.
We choose the Japanese economy as a target for the following two reasons: First, as in
Table 1, the ﬁrst tier of the social security system in Japan has a strong redistribution
eﬀect, and the basic public pension supports retired households. Our results in this paper
also apply to any other country in which the government has introduced a basic public
pension. To our knowledge, no research focuses on the pure role of the ﬁrst tier of the
social security system. Second, Japan is one of the most rapidly aging countries in the
world. A population projection indicates that the percentage of retired households will
exceed 40% by 2055. Therefore, the Japanese economy is a good example for considering
social security reform in an aging society.
We examine four social security reforms: (1) gradual reduction in the replacement
rate by half over 50 years, (2) a sudden cut of the replacement rate by half, (3) intro-
duction of a consumption tax, and (4) introduction of a capital income tax. Transitional
dynamics and social welfare of the reforms is evaluated based on a stochastic OLG
model. In the literature, many studies focus on privatization or transition to a funded
4system. In addition to the traditional reforms, we also focus on the consumption and
capital income taxes for the following reason. Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008) show
that the optimal capital income tax is positive in a life-cycle model with heterogeneous
agents and incomplete markets. Moreover, in a simple model, a consumption tax is
believed to provide a better form of taxation because it has no distortion eﬀect. We ﬁnd
that introducing a consumption tax and a capital income tax improves the position of
current young and middle households. In contrast, gradual privatization of social secu-
rity reform is not supported even by current generations, although it would create large
welfare gains in a future stationary state. Moreover, when the redistribution eﬀect of
social security is large, introduction of a consumption tax is preferred for current young
and middle generations.
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide details of our model.
In Section 3, we calibrate the parameters of the model for the Japanese economy. We
compare the stationary states of the model in Section 4. In Section 5, we consider the
transitional dynamics and the welfare implications for the economy. In Section 6, we
discuss the circumstances in which the reforms further improve welfare. Finally, we
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Overlapping Generations Model
2.1 Demographic Structure
We consider the overlapping generations model with a continuum of households.2 In
the model, time is discrete. The lifespan of households is a maximum of 100 years, but
they face mortality risks. The number of households aged j ∈{ 0,...,100} in period t is
denoted by μj,t. A fraction of households (1 − φj,t) exits the economy owing to death,
and μj+1,t+1 = φj,tμj,t is the population of households aged j +1a tp e r i o dt +1 . W e
assume that households begin economic activity at j = 20. Because households are in
their childhood at j =0 ,1,...,19, they do not engage in consumption or employment,
but they are included in the population dynamics for computing the future fertility rate.
2Our model includes the population dynamics and total factor productivity growth. Thus, to solve the
model, we need to distinguish between normal and detrended variables. For details, see the Appendix.
5We assume φ100,t =0 . L e tμt =( μ0,t,...,μ 100,t) denotes the population distribution
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where ψt is the population growth rate of age 0 from t to t +1 . 3 New households enter
the economy in period t+1asμ0,t+1 =( 1+ψt)μ0,t. The aggregate population including
children at t is Nt =
 100
j=0 μj,t. We denote the population growth rate from period t to
t+1asnt, i.e., Nt+1 =( 1+nt)Nt. Although the population distribution is constant over
time in the stationary state (i.e., μj+1,t+1/Nt+1 = μj,t/Nt), the population distribution
varies in the transition paths. In the following section, we consider both the stationary
economy and the transitional dynamics.
2.2 Households
2.2.1 Objective Function
A household born in period t has a lifespan of at most 81 periods, supplies labor elasti-
cally until age 65, and faces idiosyncratic uncertainty with respect to its individual labor

















where β>0 is a discount factor and φ19,t = 1. All households have labor endowment ¯ h
and supply labor hj,t+j−20 ∈ [0,¯ h]a tj.
Since households of age j ∈{ 20,...,65} are of employable age, they can supply
labor elastically. Thereafter, i.e., j ∈{ 66,...,100}, households retire and receive social
security beneﬁt from the government.
3See R´ ıos-Rull (2001) for details on the transition of population distribution.
62.2.2 Earnings Proﬁle and Idiosyncratic Income Risk
All households have deterministic labor productivity. Average earnings must reﬂect age-
speciﬁc average labor productivity. Average labor productivity grows when households
are young and peaks in middle age around 50; in other words, the eﬃciency of a house-
hold has a hump shape over its working life. We denote the deterministic productivity
measured by hourly wages as {κj}
65
j=20.
In addition to the average productivity, all households face idiosyncratic skill risks
when they are in employment. Following Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2004), we
assume that the idiosyncratic risk comprises three components: (1) transitory shocks, (2)
persistent shocks, and (3) the ﬁxed eﬀect. The idiosyncratic labor productivity process
ej is speciﬁed as follows:











zj = ρzj−1 + ηj,η j ∼N(0,σ2
η,j). (2)
The ﬁxed eﬀect is denoted by the variance of α, and the transitory shock as that of
εt, both of which follow the log-normal distribution. A persistent component of the
idiosyncratic shock is represented by zt, which is composed of the persistence parameter
ρ and the persistent shock ηj.L e ts ≡ (α,z,ε) ∈ S represent a state of the idiosyncratic
shocks for an individual household. We assume that the average eﬃciency proﬁle and
the stochastic process are independent of time t. Thus, the pre-tax labor earning of each
age group is determined by yj,t = wtκjejhj,t,w h e r ewt is the economy-wide wage level.
2.2.3 Social Security System
The government grants social security beneﬁts through a ﬂat payroll tax from labor
earnings, and retired households receive the social security beneﬁt. The ﬂat payroll tax
rate is denoted as τss
t . Moreover, we deﬁne the consumption tax rate and the linear
capital income tax rate as τcon
t and τ
cap
t , respectively. After retirement, a household
receives a lump-sum social security beneﬁt ϕtwtHt,w h e r eϕt is a replacement rate and
wtHt is the average earnings of workers as deﬁned later.
7Since we assume that the social security beneﬁt is constant for all households, the
social security system in our model has large redistribution eﬀects.4 We assume that the
social security beneﬁt in our model consists of the ﬁrst tier of the social security system,
as mentioned in Section 1. Although the social security system diﬀers signiﬁcantly across
countries, it generally contains large redistribution mechanisms. The earnings-related
or deﬁned contribution part of the public pension, i.e., the insurance part, has relatively
small impact on redistribution. On the other hand, the redistribution part has a strong
redistributive mechanism, especially at the minimum or resource-tested level. To focus
on the redistribution eﬀect, we assume that the social security beneﬁt is constant, which
corresponds to the ﬁrst-tier of the social security system. As the insurance part of the
social security system, we consider private annuity markets, originally introduced by
Yaari (1965) and recently investigated by Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008). Hansen and
˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008) deﬁne partial annuitization by assuming the price of the annuity
by Λj,t =1− λ(1 − φj,t), where λ characterizes the fraction of the annuitized asset.
We consider two extreme cases: (1) there exists a perfect annuity market, λ =1 ,a n d
(2) there exists no such market, λ = 0. Since households face mortality risk, some
households may die with positive assets. If we assume the existence of private annuity
markets, then the assets are annuitized. In this case, the role of insurance for long living
in the social security system is eliminated completely. On the contrary, if there are no
such markets, we assume that the accidental bequests are collected by the government
and redistributed to all households as a lump-sum transfer bt.
A household has some asset holdings aj,t ∈ A at age j and in period t.T h e a s -
sets contain annuitized and non annuitized components. The budget constraints for
employees and retirees are as follows:
(1 + τcon
t )cj,t +Λ j,taj+1,t+1 ≤ (1 + (1 − τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+( 1− τss
t )wtκjejhj,t, :E m p l o y e e
(1 + τcon
t )cj,t +Λ j,taj+1,t+1 ≤ (1 + (1 − τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+wtϕtHt, : Retiree
where rt is the net interest rate at t. We assume that households face a liquidity con-
4˙ Imrohoro˘ glu et al. (1995) and Conesa and Krueger (1999) consider an eﬃcient social security system
with a constant social security beneﬁt. On the other hand, Storesletten et al. (2004) assume that the
social security beneﬁt depends on the resource test. See Storeslettten et al. (1999) and Huggett and
Ventura (1999) for the redistributive eﬀects of the social security system in the US.
8straint, i.e., aj,t ≥ 0.
2.3 Behavior of Firms and the Factor Prices





where At denotes the total factor productivity (TFP) in period t, Kt is the aggregate cap-
ital, and Ht is the aggregate labor supply measured by eﬃciency units. We assume that
a sequence of the TFP is deterministic. Therefore, there are no aggregate uncertainties
in the economy, and the aggregate productivity and population growth can be forecasted
accurately. We denote the gross growth rate of the TFP as 1 + gt =( At+1/At)1/(1−θ).
The asset holdings and labor supply of each household diﬀer even in the same co-
hort and age group, due to idiosyncratic income risks. We denote a fraction of house-
holds aged j with asset a, and realize productivity s as Φt (a,s,j).5 By construction,
 
dΦt (a,s,j) = 1. The aggregate capital and labor supply are determined by the sums

























where δ is the depreciation rate.
2.4 The Government
We assume that the government collects tax to ﬁnance social security beneﬁts and re-
distributes it to retired households in a lump-sum manner, and we do not consider other
5For details of the distribution function, see the Appendix.
9government expenditures. The social security system is governed by the Pay-As-You-





t ), and grants social security beneﬁts. We assume that the
replacement rate ϕt is ﬁxed exogenously, and that the corresponding payroll tax rate
is determined endogenously. We denote the aggregate social security payments by the
payroll tax as TSS
t , by the consumption tax as TCON
t , by the capital income tax as TCAP
t ,
and aggregate social security beneﬁt as Bt.








































t is the propotion of retired households in the total population. Note that the
average labor earning of all workers is wtHt.





μj,t(1 − λ)(1 − φj,t)aj,t.
Note that if λ = 1, all assets are perfectly annuitized, and there are no accidental
bequests.
From the above, the Bellman equation of age j in period t is
Vj,t(aj,s j)=m a x
 





t )cj,t +Λ j,taj+1,t+1 ≤ (1 + (1 − τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+( 1− τss
t )wtκjejhj,t, (7)
(1 + τcon
t )cj,t +Λ j,taj+1,t+1 ≤ (1 + (1 − τ
cap
t )rt)(aj,t + bt)+ϕtwtHt, (8)
102.5 Deﬁnition of a Competitive Equilibrium
Our concern is the stationary state and the transitional dynamics of the economy. There-
fore, we need two deﬁnitions of equilibrium, one in the stationary state and the other in
transition.
Deﬁnition 1 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) Given the government’s pol-
icy {ϕt} and the population dynamics, the Recursive Competitive Equilibrium is a set of
value functions {Vt}, policy functions {gc
j,t,gh
j,t,ga
j,t}, aggregate capital {Kt}, aggregate




t } that satisfy
the following conditions:









the associated policy functions. The value and policy functions are measurable.
(ii) A Firm’s Optimality: The factor prices are competitively determined as follows,
rt = θAt (Kt/Ht)
θ−1 − δ, wt =( 1− θ)At (Kt/Ht)
θ .
(iii) Market Clearing: The market clearing conditions of equations (3) and (4) are
satisﬁed.
(iv) the Government’s Budget: The governments’ budget (5) clears.
(v) Transition Law: Φt+1 = T (Φt).
Deﬁnition 2 (Stationary Recursive Competitive Equilibrium) The Stationary Re-
cursive Competitive Equilibrium is a recursive competitive equilibrium with a stationarity
of distribution Φj,t+1 =Φ j,t(∀t) for each age group j.
The ﬁnal purpose of the paper is to investigate the welfare implications of the com-
petitive equilibrium on the transition path, which requires complex computation. In this
paper, we follow the method proposed by Conesa and Krueger (1999) and Nishiyama
and Smetters (2005,2007), who compute two stationary equilibria and their transition
path. Thus, to compute the transition path, we need to calibrate the initial and ﬁnal
stationary states. We set the initial stationary state of Japanese economy in the year
2008 and the ﬁnal state in the year 2200.6
6In the actual numerical procedure, we compute a detrended path.
113 Calibration
3.1 Preference and Production Parameters
First, we calibrate the fundamental parameters in the model. As the target of the initial
stationary state, we choose the Japanese economy in the year 2008.
Households enter into our economy at age 20, supply labor until 65, and live till at













The elasticity of the intertemporal substitution (EIS) parameter is set as γ =2 . T h i s
value is standard in the macroeconomics literature. Abe, Inakura, and Yamada (2007)
estimate the preference parameters in Japan by structural estimation using Japanese
Panel Study of Consumers data compiled by the Institute of Household Economy, and
determined that the EIS parameter ranges from 2 to 7. A share parameter for consump-
tion and leisure is set as σ =0 .55 to match the average work hours in the model with
the actual Japanese data. In the model, we use an equilibrium interest rate of 4%, which
is the average return of capital in Japan in 2000, as estimated by Hayashi and Prescott
(2000), in the model as a target to determine the discount factor, β =0 .989. For the
available time endowment ¯ h, it is assumed that all households have 16 hours × 5d a y s
× 4 weeks × 12 month per year, i.e., ¯ h = 3840.
Finally, we choose the parameters for the production function. The capital share
parameter θ is ﬁxed at 0.362, from Hayashi and Prescott (2002). The depreciation rate
is also taken from Hayashi and Prescott (2002), and the value is speciﬁed at δ =0 .083.
These values are the average of the 1990s in Japan.8 In our model, the TFP growth rate
7We use the nonseparable utility function that is used in the broad macroeconomics literature be-
cause we consider a growth economy. In contrast, some empirical researches reveal that microeconomic
behavior is consistent with the separable utility function, although this is in contradiction with a grow-
ing economy. Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008) investigate the importance of insurance for
income risks when the utility function is separable and nonseparable with respect to leisure. ˙ Imrohorolu
and Kitao (2008) indicate that diﬀerences in the elasticity of labor supply have a surprisingly small eﬀect
on social security reform, although they result in a large reallocation of working hours over the life cycle.
8For details of data description, see Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
12is provided exogenously and can be forecasted accurately. From Hayashi and Prescott
(2002), Chen et al. (2007), and Braun et al. (2007), the TFP growth is set as 1 + gt =
1.02, which is the average between 1960 and 2000.
3.2 Idiosyncratic Income Risk
Estimating parameters for the idiosyncratic income risks that all households face is dif-
ﬁcult because of the scarcity of micro data in Japan. Ohtake and Saito (1998) indicate
that the logarithm of the variance of income in Japan increases across age groups. More-
over, they show that the shape of the age-variance proﬁle is convex over age groups. To
account for the convexity of the variance proﬁle, Abe and Yamada (2006) specify the
labor income process and estimate the parameters In this paper, we use the estimated
data shown in Appendix Table 2 in Abe and Yamada (2006). To incorporate the non-
linearity of the income variances, we use an age-dependent income variance shock. We
choose the income shock parameters to match the cross-sectional variance of income.
Following Storesletten et al. (2004), we assume that the idiosyncratic labor pro-
ductivity process follows equations (1) and (2). Abe and Yamada (2006) report on the
possibility of ρ ≥ 1 because of the convexity of the variance proﬁle. However, incorpo-
rating ρ ≥ 1 makes the numerical computation far more diﬃcult. Thus, we choose the
persistence parameter to be close to one; moreover, the standard deviation of the persis-
tence shock increases across age groups (i.e., ρ =0 .98, ση20 =0 .05, and  ση =0 .0005).9
After the speciﬁcation, we approximate the persistent shock process as a seven-state
Markov chain by Tauchen’s (1986) method. Assuming the initial value of the persis-
tent shock, z20, to be zero, an intercept of the income variance proﬁle, i.e., the income
variance of age 20, implies the sum of the variances of the transitory shock and the
ﬁxed eﬀect. Because the income variance of age 20 is about 0.1 from Abe and Yamada
(2006), the standard deviation of the transitory shock and the ﬁxed eﬀect are estimated
to be σε =0 .08, and σα =0 .25, respectively. Both are approximated by two states as
{e−σ,e σ}.10
9The variance of the persistent shock represents the slopes of the income variance proﬁle over the life
cycle. For details, see Storesletten et al. (2004).
10Based on this calibration, the model-generated income variances proﬁle matches the actual income
133.3 Average Hourly Wage Proﬁle
The eﬃciency unit of average productivity for each age {κj} determines the average
hourly wage proﬁle. We conduct the calculation following the method proposed by
Hansen (1993), and in particular, that by Braun et al. (2007), which is based on the
Report on the Special Survey of the Labor Force Survey by the Statistics Bureau, the
Management and Coordination Agency, Government of Japan. Table 2 lists the average
hourly wage for each age group. we use a smoothed proﬁle.
3.4 Demographic Structure
We set demographic parameters to replicate the actual and projected population dy-
namics. The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (NIPSSR)
provides population projections from 2005 to 2055.11 We set the survival probability
{φj,t}2055
t=2005 from the medium variant of the value estimated by the NIPSSR. The fer-
tility rate ψt is also taken from the medium variants of the projections. Because the
population growth in our model is represented by the growth rate of newborns, we use
the ratio of the projected population of newborns between period t and t +1 .
As we need to compute two stationary states and the transition paths, we set the
initial stationary state in the year 2008. After the population changes from 2008 to
2055, following the projection by the NIPSSR, the population growth rate is assumed to
converge to zero over 10 years between 2055 and 2064. Although the population growth
rate of the newborns converges immediately, it takes approximately 100 years to reach
a new stationary population distribution.
One problem that arises here is how to choose an initial population distribution in
the initial stationary state. The actual population distribution in 2008 does not seem to
be stationary because of the existence of the baby boomer generation, which is shown in
Figure 1.12 However, to compute the initial stationary state, a population distribution is
variances over the life cycle in Japan. For details, see Yamada (2008).
11Details are available from the web: http://www.ipss.go.jp/p-info/e/psj2008/PSJ2008.html
12The population distribution in 2005 is obtained from Population Census by the Ministry of Internal
Aﬀairs and Communications in Japan, and the distribution in 2008 is calculated by the mortality and
fertility rates estimates between 2005 and 2008.
14required. Therefore, we assume that the households in the model believe that the actual
population in 2008 is stationary.
The projection by the NIPSSR indicates three variants, the high, medium, and low
population projections. We plot the fraction of the child population (under the age of
19), the working population (20-65), and the retired population (66-100) in Figure 2. In
the medium variant projection, the fraction of retired households peaks around 2070, and
thereafter, the rate converges to a new stationary state. In the low variant, the fraction
of the retired households reaches over 40% and the working population decreases sharply
with fewer births.
4 Stationary State Comparison
4.1 Four Policy Experiments
Before considering the complicated Japanese economy with aging, we consider a simple
demographic structure to focus on the pure redistributive eﬀect of social security reforms.
The population distribution is constant over time, i.e., the population growth rate is
zero.13
As policy experiments, we consider four social security reform plans. We calculate
the equilibrium paths of the following scenarios:14
Benchmark As a benchmark, the replacement rate is targeted to be 25%, i.e., ϕt =
0.25. Although the replacement rate seems to be low compared with previous
research such as Conesa and Krueger (1999), we focus only on the redistribution
part, as mentioned in Section 1. In other words, we examine the economic impli-
cations of the ﬁrst tier of the social security system. The average is around 25%
(See Table 1).
13We use the survival probability in 2008 over time, and the population distribution is calculated using
μj+1 = φj,2008μj.
14Conesa and Krueger (1999) consider three cases: (1) a sudden cut in social security beneﬁt, (2) a
gradual decrease in the replacement rate over 50 years, (3) and a cut in social security after 20 years.
15Case (1) Gradual Decline We consider a gradual cut in the social security beneﬁt to
half over 50 years; i.e., the ﬁnal replacement rate is 12.5%.15
Case (2) Sudden Cut We again consider a cut in the social security beneﬁt by half.
However the replacement rate is cut suddenly in 2009.
Case (3) Consumption Tax We introduce a consumption tax for ﬁnancing social se-
curity payments to retired households. The consumption tax rate τcon
t is set as
5%. We choose the tax rates such that the remaining (determined endogenously)
payroll tax rate is almost the same as in the capital income tax case stated below.
Case (4) Capital Income Tax We introduce a linear capital income tax to ﬁnance
the social security beneﬁts in part. The tax rate τ
cap
t is set as 25%. In this tax
rate, the remaining payroll tax rate is approximately 1%, which is similar to the
consumption tax case. Moreover, when we employ consumption tax and capital
income tax rates of 5% and 25%, respectively, the welfare gain of introducing the
capital income tax is similar to the case of the consumption tax.
4.2 Welfare Evaluation Measures
To compare social security reforms, we need a criterion that evaluates the social welfare
of households. First, to evaluate the welfare of households, following Aiyagari and Mc-
Grattan (1998), Conesa and Krueger (1999), and Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2008),




This welfare criterion implies that we use a measure of the expected value of households
who enter the economy in period t at age 20. In other words, it is a lifetime discounted
value of each cohort before entering the economy. By assumption, the households have











15For half privatization of the social security system, see Nishiyama and Smetters (2007).
16which compares the consumption equivalent variation of cohorts between the benchmark
and a social security reform.
As a second welfare measure, we introduce hypothetical voting of the existing gen-
erations, as in Conesa and Krueger (1999). Suppose that a household weakly prefers to
reform the social security system, i.e., V Reform
j,2008 (a,s) ≥ V Bench
j,2008 (a,s), then the household
with state (a,s,j) votes in agreement with the reform. Then, the total agreement of








I(a,s,j)=1 , if V Reform




4.3 Stationary State Analysis
Table 3 summarizes the macroeconomic and microeconomic statistics in the benchmark
case and social security reforms, when the population distribution is constant.16 Com-
pared with the benchmark case, half privatization implies capital deepening, and as a
result, the interest rate declines by 0.5%. As households receive a low social security
payment after retirement, they accumulate more wealth. Moreover, they also supply
labor more extensively. When the government reduces the replacement rate by half, the
labor supply measured by eﬃciency (Earning) increases by 7.7%. An interesting point
is that working hours do not increase as much as earnings. This implies that highly pro-
ductive households supply labor more intensively. As a result, the output and aggregate
consumption also rise. The welfare implication of half privatization is consistent with
previous research, such as ˙ Imrohorolu et al. (1995). That is, the optimal replacement
rate is close to zero, and in our calculation, half privatization implies a welfare gain of
2.7%, as calculated using equation (10).
16In the stationary state comparison, there are no diﬀerences between gradual declines and a sudden
cut of the replacement rate.
17The introduction of a consumption tax and a capital income tax as a source of ﬁnance
results in similar eﬀects on the payroll tax rate, i.e., the resulting payroll tax rates are
1.1% and 1.4%, respectively. In other words, in our model, a consumption tax of 5%
and a capital income tax of 25% collect similar amounts of social security payments.
However, these taxes aﬀect wealth accumulation in opposite ways. If the government
introduces a consumption tax, the capital-output ratio increases slightly, and it has
a small eﬀect on work hours. Note that in a model with a labor/leisure choice, the
consumption tax causes tax distortion, although the Euler equation does not include the
consumption tax rate, because it is included in the intratemporal ﬁrst order equation.
On the other hand, a capital income tax oﬀers a disincentive for accumulating wealth.
However, the introduction of either a consumption tax or a capital income tax re-
sults in similar welfare gains of 1.1% or 1.2%, respectively. Because households in our
model face idiosyncratic income risks, based on our welfare criterion, the basic public
pension system has an insurance eﬀect on lifetime income. In other words, the basic
public pension equalizes the lifetime income of all households in ex-ante criterion. This
equalization eﬀect is larger in the consumption and capital income taxes than in the
payroll tax, because these taxes are also collected from retirees, who are much more
unequal than young households. Moreover, the basic public pension has diﬀerent ef-
fects on the wealth rich and the wealth poor. The wealth rich accumulate more near
retirement for consumption smoothing, and the wealth poor decumulate wealth for the
same reason. The capital income tax collects more social security payments from the
wealth rich. Therefore, the welfare eﬀect of the capital income tax measured by the
consumption equivalent variation is slightly higher than that of the consumption tax,
even though the remaining payroll tax is higher in the case of the capital income tax.
Therefore, social welfare has improved based on the stationary state comparison in
all social security reforms. However, there may exist households who lose welfare in the
transitional dynamics.
185 Transitional Dynamics with/without Population Aging
5.1 Constant Population Distribution
In general, transitional dynamics describes very complicated paths because demographics
do not change monotonically. To focus on the social security reforms, as a ﬁrst step, we
consider a simple demographic structure: the population distribution is constant over
time.
Figure 3 shows the transitional dynamics of the interest rate, the payroll tax, ag-
gregate capital, and aggregate labor. The aggregate variables are normalized to be one
at period 0. In the equilibrium path, the interest rate declines when the government
reduces the replacement rate by half gradually or suddenly, which is not surprising be-
cause households need to accumulate more wealth for their retirement. Moreover, the
interest rate declines when the social security payment is ﬁnanced by a consumption
tax. In contrast, introducing a capital income tax increases the interest rate because
the capital income tax creates a disincentive for accumulating assets. Although a social
security reform is introduced in year 1, the adjustment of capital and labor continues for
more than 10 years. Thus, even though the payroll tax rate is reduced suddenly rather
than by gradual decline, the interest rate adjusts slowly.
5.2 Welfare Comparison of Each Cohort
In the previous section, we focused on the general equilibrium eﬀect of the social security
reforms. Next, we consider the welfare implications of the reforms, especially those for
intergenerational inequality. In Figure 4, we plot the social welfare of each cohort based
on equation (10). In the long run, the consumption equivalent variation measures of
the social security reforms converge to new stationary state values after the reform. In
particular, the consumption tax and the capital income tax converge to a similar level in
the long run. However, the reforms have diﬀerent eﬀects on the existing and near-future
generations.
If the lines in Figure 4 are below 0%, such generations exhibit distaste for reforms.
Not surprisingly, the gradual privatization damages the welfare of the current generations
19signiﬁcantly, due to the tax burden and small beneﬁts. Thus, the CEQ variation is below
the benchmark for all generations who enter the economy before period 0. For example,
households around age 40, who entered the economy 20 years earlier, reduce the CEQ
by 1.4%. In contrast, the other three ﬁnancing schemes have diﬀerent implications. A
sudden cut in the social security beneﬁt improves the welfare of the current young and
middle generations, based on the cohort’s welfare. Although the sudden cut damages the
older generations by more than 2%, as measured by the CEQ, such a policy improves the
welfare of young cohorts, as they bear no cost and the optimal replacement rate is very
low. Introducing a consumption tax and a capital income tax also improves the welfare
of the current young and middle generations. Both taxes enhance intragenerational
inequality in an economy with a basic public pension, because of its redistribution eﬀect.
In particular, because the asset proﬁle is strongly hump-shaped, the capital income tax is
preferred by young households. Compared with the capital income tax, the consumption
tax shares the burden across all generations equally, because of the ﬂat consumption
proﬁle. Old households prefer to stay with the status-quo social security system for the
three reforms.
5.3 Social Security Reforms in Japanese Economy
In the transition path, many factors reallocate resources, including aging, an increasing
tax burden, and changing factor prices. In particular, the fraction of the retirees in the
total population exceeds 40% in Japan, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, the aging level of
the Japanese economy will at least temporarily be considerably larger than in the ﬁnal
stationary equilibrium.
As a benchmark, we use the medium variant of the population projection by the
NIPSSR. Figure 5 plots the general equilibrium paths of the interest rate, payroll tax
rate, aggregate capital, and labor. Figure 1 shows that the population distribution in
Japan is not very smooth, due to baby boomers and their children. Therefore, the
general equilibrium path ﬂuctuates erratically compared with Figure 3. Contrary to
Figure 3, the interest rate declines after all social security reforms. There is a signiﬁcant
predicted capital deepening and aggregate capital increases for 30 years. According to
20the aging, the payroll tax rate increases sharply, and becomes more than 10% without
reform. Note that this value is the tax rate of the ﬁrst tier only. Therefore, the total
tax burden of social security may be more than 20% of earnings, when we consider the
cost of sustaining the current total social security system in Japan.17
In an economy with signiﬁcant aging, there exists crucial intergenerational inequality.
Based on various population projections, Figure 6 plots the welfare of each cohort, and
the CEQ is normalized such that households who enter the economy in 1950 appear as
zero. Although this criterion calculates the dynamic general equilibrium eﬀect of aging
only by comparing diﬀerent generations of household, young generations of Japanese
households suﬀer from aging and a tax burden, and at the bottom of the welfare are
the current and near-future young. Although the welfare rebounds weakly, some social
security reform should be seriously considered.
5.4 Welfare Comparison and Majority Voting
Based on the transitional dynamics of the Japanese economy, we calculate the consump-
tion equivalent variation of each cohort with social security reform in Panel (a) of Figure
7. The shape is similar to the case in Figure 4. Two privatization policies have a large
impact on the young and old compared with the case of a constant population. The grad-
ual decline in the replacement rate by half is not preferred by the current generations,
as ever. In particular, the current young and middle generations suﬀer a consumption
loss of more than 2% from such a reform because they pay more tax and receive less. As
also in Figure 4, although the introduction of the consumption tax and capital income
tax improves future generations, middle and old households do not prefer such reforms.
We ﬁnally consider intragenerational inequality. Conesa and Krueger (1999) consider
the hypothetical voting of each household.18 We consider voting conducted in 2008. If
17In the social security reform in Japan in 2004, the government decided to set the ceiling of the
payroll tax rate as about 18%. The government decumulates the social security funds and the payment
of the public pension may also decline, although the government promises to maintain the replacement
rate above 50%.
18Boldrin and Rustichini (2000) and Casamatta, Cremer, and Psetieau (2000) consider the political
decision process of social security reforms more explicitly.
21a household agrees to some reform, i.e., V Reform
j,2008 (aj,s j) ≥ V Bench
j,2008 (aj,s j), he/she votes.
The aggregated value of voting by age is plotted in Panel (a) of Figure 8. Consistent
with Figure 7, middle and old households do not vote in agreement with any social
security reform. However, the sudden cut, a consumption tax, and a capital income tax
are the candidates that young and middle households support. In the case of very young
households, such as the early 20s, all households agree to the reforms. Because there
is heterogeneity in a cohort, opinion is divided even at the same age. For example, the
asset rich do not prefer the capital income tax as much as the asset poor of the same
age. The capital income tax is preferred more around age 40, because the asset proﬁle
increases sharply, and there is thus a cutoﬀ point for voting around this age. Note that
half privatization obtains no agreement in an economy with aging. This is also consistent
with Figure 7.19
6 When does the Social Security Reform Gains more Wel-
fare?
6.1 Strong Redistribution Eﬀect
To clarify the redistribution eﬀect of social security reform, we consider a strong re-
distribution policy. Although the overall entitlement of the ﬁrst tier of social security
is generally less than 30% in many OECD countries, as listed in Table 1, we set the
replacement rate as 40% when considering a strong redistribution eﬀect. Panel (b) of
Figure 7 shows that this does not change the shape of cohorts’ welfare proﬁle, although
a privatization policy is more eﬀective in this case.
Panel (b) of Figure 8 shows that the consumption tax and capital income tax are
more supported by the young through voting, due to their insurance and redistribution
eﬀects. Moreover, if the redistribution eﬀect is strong, the discrepancy between con-
sumption tax and capital income tax in voting becomes small. When the replacement
19This result may seem inconsistent with Conesa and Krueger (1999) who ﬁnd that although there
exists a status-quo bias, young households preferred to reduce the replacement rate. They discuss
whether the vote on reforms declines if the heterogeneity of the model becomes larger. Our model is
more heterogeneous than their model because we consider three types of income risks.
22rate is high, the corresponding payroll tax rate becomes high and the consumption pro-
ﬁle becomes steeper. In other words, the young consume less. Thus, young households
support a consumption tax more, due to the lower tax burden. Because the welfare gain
through privatization is large, gradual and sudden cuts are supported by many house-
holds compared with the benchmark case. In general, social security reform should be
discussed regarding not only the source of ﬁnance, but also the extent of redistribution.
Therefore, the source of ﬁnance for social security should focus more attention on the
redistribution eﬀects.
6.2 No Private Annuity Market
Finally, we investigate the role of a private annuity market in the model. If private
annuity markets do not exist, the social security system oﬀers insurance against long-
living risks. Because households evaluate consumption weakly in old age due to high
discounting, the asset holdings of middle and old households decline. As a result, the
welfare gain from a capital income tax and a consumption tax also declines slightly, as
shown in Panel (c) of Figure 7. In particular, even in the long-run stationary state,
the capital income tax does not attain a high value with the tax rate of 25% compared
with the economy with a consumption tax. Therefore, a capital income tax should be
introduced with the private annuity market.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we consider the welfare implications of social security reforms using an
overlapping generations model with idiosyncratic income risks and private annuity mar-
kets. We examined four reforms: (1) gradual privatization by half, (2) sudden cut in the
replacement rate by half, (3) introduction of a consumption tax, and (4) introduction
of a capital income tax. We ﬁnd that all four cases improve welfare by a stationary
state comparison. In contrast, no one supports gradual privatization through majority
voting, because all current generations would ﬁnd their welfare reduced during the tran-
sitional dynamics. A consumption tax and a capital income tax improve the welfare of
the current young and middle generations below 40, although they are a minority in the
23economy. We also reveal that in designing social security systems, we need to consider
two redistribution eﬀects of the basic pension. The redistribution eﬀects consist of the
insurance eﬀect on lifetime income, i.e., intragenerational inequality, and the intertempo-
ral eﬀect that aﬀects the asset and consumption proﬁle. When the consumption proﬁle
is steep, for example, the replacement rate is high, a consumption tax is supported by
the current young generations.
This research focuses on the redistribution eﬀect of the basic public pension, i.e., the
ﬁrst tier. In future research, we should extend the research to the second tier, which may
include earnings-related components of the social security system and private deﬁned
contributions. Moreover, we should seriously consider a resource-tested basic public
pension. In this paper, the voting mechanism is very simple and all social security
reforms are rejected. We believe that political support should be seriously considered
when considering some social security reforms. For example, a nonlinear capital income
tax may improve the welfare of the majority in an economy with heterogeneous agents.
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29Age Hourly Wage Age Hourly Wage
20–24 1,349 45–49 3,075
25–29 1,777 50–54 3,145
30–34 2,187 55–59 2,797
35–39 2,548 60–64 1,923
40–44 2,842 65– 1,617
Table 2: Average Hourly Wage for Each Age Group (Yen)
30Benchmark Half Con. Tax Cap. Tax
K/Y 2.92 3.06 2.98 2.78
ch(K/Y) (%) − 4.92 2.06 −4.64
r (%) 4.10 3.52 3.85 4.70
ch(w)( % ) − 2.76 1.16 −2.66
Payroll Tax Rate (%) 6.53 3.27 1.10 1.40
ch(K) (%) − 9.20 3.26 −6.72
ch(Earning) (%) − 7.77 7.04 3.17
ch(Hours) (%) − 1.56 −0.06 0.62
ch(Y )( % ) − 4.08 1.18 −2.19
ch(C)( % ) − 1.87 0.24 −0.29
EV (%) − 2.71 1.10 1.23






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Hypothetical Voting
39A Details of the Model
A.1 Detrended Macroeconomic Variables
As we consider an economy with TFP growth and population dynamics, we need to
remove the trend to solve the equilibrium numerically. Deﬁne the TFP factor growth







´ 1 + gt;
Nt+1
Nt
´ 1 + nt:
Note that the adjustment parameter is not the TFP level At, but the TFP factor A
1=(1¡µ)
t .
We divide all macroeconomic variables by A
1=(1¡µ)
t Nt for detrending, excluding the ag-
gregate labor supply. After normalization, the macroeconomic variables are re-deﬁned
as follows:
˜ Yt = Yt=(A
1=(1¡µ)
t Nt); ˜ Kt = Kt=(A
1=(1¡µ)
t Nt); ˜ Ht = Ht=Nt:










Thus, the equilibrium wage level grows with the productivity.
A.2 Normalized Household Problem
In this paper, a household’s optimization problem is deﬁned as follows1:
Vj;t(a;s) = max
©





t )cj;t + Λj;taj+1;t+1 · (1 + (1 ¡ ¿
cap
t )rt)(aj;t + bt) + (1 ¡ ¿ss
t )wt·jejhj;t;
(1 + ¿con
t )cj;t + Λj;taj+1;t+1 · (1 + (1 ¡ ¿
cap
t )rt)(aj;t + bt) + wt'(¿t)Ht;
Because microeconomic variables are not aﬀected by the population trend, we need
to detrend them using the TFP factor growth rate alone. Thus, we deﬁne cj;t=A
1=(1¡µ)
t =
1For generality, following Hansen and ˙ Imrohoro˘ glu (2008), we denote the price of the annuity as
Λj;t = 1 ¡ ¸(1 ¡ Áj;t), and bt is the lump-sum redistribution of unannuitized asset.
40˜ cj;t, aj;t=A
1=(1¡µ)
t = ˜ aj;t, and hj;t = ˜ hj;t. Then, the normalized Bellman equation becomes
as follows:
vj;t(˜ aj;s) = max
n





t )˜ cj;t + (1 + gt)Λj;t˜ aj+1;t+1 = (1 + (1 ¡ ¿
cap
t )rt)(˜ aj;t +˜ bt) + (1 ¡ ¿ss
t ) ˜ wt·jej˜ hj;t;
(3)
(1 + ¿con
t )˜ cj;t + (1 + gt)Λj;t˜ aj+1;t+1 = (1 + (1 ¡ ¿
cap
t )rt)(˜ aj;t +˜ bt) + ˜ wt'(¿t) ˜ Ht; (4)
where ˜ ¯t = ¯(1 + gt)¾(1¡°) and ˜ bt = bt=A
1=(1¡µ)
t . Moreover, by deﬁning ˜ ' ´ 't=Nt, we
can formulate the normalized social security payment as a fraction of average earnings.
A.3 First Order Conditions
From the ﬁrst-order conditions of the Bellman equation (2) and the envelope theorem,
we obtain
u0
c(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t) ¡ »(1 + ¿con
t ) = 0;
¡u0




Λj;t + Áj;t˜ ¯tEj
@vj+1;t+1(˜ a0;s0)










c(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t)
¡u0
h(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t) + »(1 ¡ ¿ss
t ) ˜ wt·jej = 0;
where » is a Lagrange multiplier on a budget constraint.
From the Envelope Theorem, the intertemporal and intratemporal ﬁrst-order condi-
tions are as follows:
u0











c(˜ cj+1;t+1;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj+1;t+1);
u0
h(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t)
(1 ¡ ¿ss
t ) ˜ wt·jej
=
u0




If the utility function is of Cobb–Douglas type, the Euler equation is as follows:
[˜ c¾







































A.4 Law of Motion
Deﬁne the probability space as ((A £ S £ J);B((A £ S £ J));Φj) where B((A £ S £ J))
is a Borel ¾-ﬁeld and Φt (X) is a probability measure over X 2 B((A £ S £ J)). From
the policy function and the transition probability of labor skill ¼ (s0js) ´ Pr("0) £
Pr(z0jz), the transition function Qt (¢;¢) over household’s states (a;s;j) and the distribu-
tion function Φj;t(a;s;j) is computable.2 The probability measure is deﬁned over house-
hold’s state and also represents the fraction of households with state X 2 B((A £ S £ J)).
Because we assume that households of age j = 20 have zero assets, Φ20 is equal to one
on a20;t = 0. The transition function Qj : (A £ S £ J) £ B((A £ S £ J))) ! [0;1] is
deﬁned as






¼ (s0js) if ga
j;t (˜ a;s) 2 X
0 else
, for all j = 20;:::;100:
Given initial distribution Φ20;t, the distribution function fΦj;tg100
j=21 for each j is
mapped by the following equation.
Φj+1;t+1 (X) =
Z
Qj ((A £ S £ J);X)dΦj;t; (8X 2 B(A £ S £ J)), j = 20;:::;100;
Φt+1 = T (Φt):
Note that population change is adjusted by ¹t, and that the TFP growth is already
included. Thus, this distribution is purely wealth distribution for each generation.
2For details, see Stokey et al. (1989). For the computation of the distribution function, we follow
Young’s (2004) method. Also see Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998).
42B Numerical Procedure
B.1 Endogenous Gridpoint Method
Among the many available procedures for computing the policy function, we apply the
Endogenous Gridpoint Method (EGM) by Carroll (2006), because it is a safe and rela-
tively fast method.3












c(˜ cj+1;t+1;¯ h ¡ hj+1;t+1);
and take discretized grids on ˜ a0 2 [0;a]. We set the number of grids to be 80. From
equation (5), the intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition is rewritten as follows:
u0





Thus, if we can compute Γ0
j;t for each discretized state (˜ a0;sj), after taking the inverse
of the utility function, we obtain consumption ˜ cj;t for each state.
Suppose that next period’s consumption and labor supply functions are already
known as
˜ cj+1;t+1 = ˜ gc
j+1;t+1(˜ xj+1;t+1;s0);
hj+1;t+1 = ˜ gh
j+1;t+1(˜ xj+1;t+1;s0); if j · 65;
where ˜ xj+1;t+1 ´ (1 + (1 ¡ ¿
cap
t+1)rt+1)(˜ a0 + ˜ bt+1) + (1 ¡ ¿ss
t+1) ˜ wt+1·j+1ej+1¯ ht+1 is cash
on hand.4 Then, we can compute the Γ0
j;t (˜ a0;sj) for each grid f˜ a0
ig80
i=1 for each age
by backward induction. When we compute Γ0
j;t for each discretized state (˜ a0;sj), if the
marginal utility function is invertible, we obtain the equilibrium consumption ˜ cj for each
state.
3For details on the endogeneous gridpoint method with endogenous labor supply, see appendix in
Krueger and Ludwig (2006) and Barillas and Fer´ nandez-Villaverde (2006).
4Note that as the labor supply is endogenous, the cash on hand in the next period is still not
determined. Following Krueger and Ludwig (2006), we temporarily determine the cash on hand as asset
holdings plus earning with maximum supply of labor.
43Note that the marginal utility function is deﬁned as follows:
u0
c(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t) = ¾
h
˜ c¾




From the ﬁrst order condition (6), by taking the inverse of the utility function u0
c(˜ cj;t;¯ ht¡
˜ hj;t) with respect to ˜ cj, we obtain ˜ cj for each choice variable ˜ a0. Using the Euler equation
for leisure and removing ˜ hj;t, we have
u0









t ) ˜ wt·jej
´(1¡¾)(1¡°)
: hj;t > 0
u0
c(˜ cj;t;¯ h ¡ ˜ hj;t) = ¾˜ c
¾(1¡°)¡1
j;t ¯ h(1¡¾)(1¡°) : hj;t = 0
This equation is apparently invertible. Thus, we have






From consumption ˜ cj;t, we can directly induce ˜ hi




we deﬁne new cash on hand ˜ xi
j ´ (1 + gt)Λj;t˜ ai
j+1;t+1 + ˆ ci
j;t, where ˆ ci




t ) ˜ wt·jej(¯ ht ¡ ˜ hj;t).
B.2 Computation of Steady State
Computation of the stationary state is the same as in Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett
(1996). There are three markets in the model, goods, labor, and capital. However the
factor prices (r;w) are determined from the capital–labor ratio ˜ K= ˜ H. By the Walras
law, we concentrate on ˜ K= ˜ H and government budget clearing of (¿ss;¿con;¿cap).5
1. Given an initial guess of (K0;H0), compute a pair of (r0; ˜ w0). We also need initial
guess of ˜ C0 for consumption tax.
2. Given (r0; ˜ w0; ˜ K0; ˜ H0; ˜ C0) and exogenous (¿con;¿cap), compute the payroll tax rate
¿ss
0 from the government budget condition.
3. Given (r0; ˜ w0;¿ss;¿con;¿cap), compute the policy function using the EGM and
obtain the distribution function Φ0 for each age.
5We take 80 grids on asset a for computing policy function, and to compute the distribution we take
5000 grids.
444. Integrating the distribution function Φ0, we obtain the aggregate capital and labor
³





˜ K1; ˜ H1
´
and old ( ˜ K0; ˜ H0) are suﬃciently close to each other, then stop;
we have equilibrium prices for given ¿ss;0.
6. From a new equilibrium condition (r1; ˜ w1; ˜ K1; ˜ H1;C1), re-compute a new payroll
tax ¿ss;1. Repeat steps 3¡5. If the iteration error of ¿ss is suﬃciently small, stop.
We have an equilibrium.




After the computation of the stationary state in 2008 and 2200, we compute the transi-
tional path between the stationary states. The basic idea here is the same as in Conesa
and Krueger (1999) and Nishiyama and Smetters (2005).
1. Set an exogenous path of tax rates pair (¿con
t ;¿
cap
t ). Guess an equilibrium se-
quence of frt; ˜ wt;¿ss
t ; ˜ Ht;˜ btg2200
t=2008, which is needed to solve a household’s prob-
lem.6 We assume that the beneﬁt from social security and the sequence of TFP
f'(¿t);Atg2200
t=2008 are perfectly foreseen and exogenously given.
2. Because we have the policy function of the ﬁnal stationary state in 2200, we com-
pute a sequence of policy functions using the EGM by backward induction.
3. Given the policy functions, compute the distribution function from 2008 onwards
and compute aggregate variables, f ˜ Kt; ˜ Ht;rt; ˜ wtg2200
t=2008.
4. Check whether each market clearing condition and government budget balances
are satisﬁed. If these are not in equilibrium, up-date the price sequences and repeat
steps 2–3.7
5. If all markets clear in all periods, stop computation.
6For simplicity, we start a linear case.
7There are many eﬃcient methods for updating the price sequence. For example, Krueger and
Ludwig (2006) and Ludwig (2008) use a modiﬁed version of the Gauss–Zeidel method for computing the
transition path.
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